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Introduction
On December 17, 2010, Mohammad Bouazizi, a 26 year old Tunisian, set himself on fire
in front of a municipal office building after a policewoman confiscated the scales for his fruit and
vegetable stand and spit on him. His act reflected a generalized Tunisian frustration over living
standards, police violence, unemployment, and lack of recognition of human rights. Outraged
Tunisians took to the streets to protest and, within a month, Tunisia's president of over 20 years,
Ben Ali fell from power. 1
Within a few days of Ben Ali's demise, massive peaceful protests erupted in Egypt, the
most populous Middle Eastern country. In February, after 18 days of protest, and after losing
military support, 2 Egypt's president of 30 years, Hosni Mubarak, resigned and turned over power
to a military council. 3
Protesters have also taken to the streets in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. In Syria, President
Assad has been brutal in repressing the protestors. In October, the United Nations reported the
1

Ryan Rifai, Timeline: Tunisia's Uprising, ALJAZEERA,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/20111414222382736l.htm1 (last updated Jan. 23 2011).
2
Egypt News-Revolution and Aftermath, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
http://topics .nytimes.com/top/news/intemational/countriesandterritories/egypt/index.html, (Last updated Dec. 16,
2011).
3
Gary Blight et al, Arab Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlinteractive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline.
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death toll in Syria had reached 3,000 civilians. 4 The regime has not yet fallen. The UN Security
Council has failed to pass a resolution denouncing the violence in Syria. This is mainly due to
Russia and China's veto over any resolutions against Syria. 5 Therefore, the international
community has not been involved in Syria's revolution despite the mass killings taking place
there. 6
Most recently, Muammar Gaddafi, president of Libya for 42 years was captured and
killed. 7 Libya' s revolution started because the Libyan people were inspired by the events in
Egypt and Tunisia. As the uprising deepened, Gaddafi refused to resign and insisted that he
would remain in power. Unlike the peaceful protesters in Tunisia and Egypt, the anti-Gaddafi
movement in Libya took up arms against the regime. When the Libyan government began
indiscriminately killing rebels and civilians alike, the international community took action to
help protect civilians. 8
Libya is a unique situation in the Middle Eastern uprisings because the international
community actively supported the rebel movement. In March 2011, the United Nations' Security
Council unanimously agreed to intervene in Libya. Through Resolution 1973, the Council

4

Syria Uprising: The UN Says Protest Death Toll hits 3,000, BBC, (Oct. 14, 2011)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15304741 .
5
Salman Shaikh, As Syria Crisis Worsens, UN Security Council Must Act, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec
15, 2011) http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/1215/As-Syria-crisis-worsens-UN-SecurityCouncil-must-act.
6
This paper will not focus on Syria, Bahrain or Kuwait. It will only examine situations in the Arab Spring where the
UN is involved in transitional government assistance where the dictator has already fallen.
7
Timeline: Gaddaji 's 42 Years in Power, REUTERS (Oct. 23 , 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/23/uslibya-gaddafi-power-idUSTRE79Ml3C20111023 .
8
Gary Blight et al, Arab Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline.
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established a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized air strikes, commanded by NATO, to protect
civilians. 9 On October 20,2011, Gaddafi was killed and Libya was officially liberated. 10
This wave of popular movements against longstanding dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya
and the general push for democracy in the region is now commonly referred to as the "Arab
Spring." 11 Now, these countries are in the process oftransitioning to a more democratic system
of governance. While the UN has not played a major role in assisting the Egyptian or Tunisian
during their transition, the UN has exercised much greater influence in Libya.
The UN's involvement in Libya's governmental transition, apart from the military
presence, began on September 7, 2011 when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon dispatched a
letter welcoming an initial deployment of personnel in Libya at the request of Libyan
authorities. 12 Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, Prime Minister of the National Transitional Council of Libya
sent a letter to the Secretary General expressing his gratitude to UN efforts to build a sustainable
peaceful solution in Libya. 13 Then, on September 16, 2011 the council passed S/2011/580. 14 The
resolution established the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for an initial, but renewable,
period ofthree months. 15 UNSMIL's mandate calls for "the restoration of public security, order
and promote the rule of law," promotion and protection of human rights, initiation of economic
recovery, extending state authority and to "embark upon the constitution-making and electoral
process." 16 While the Security Council voted to end the NATO mission in Libya in Resolution

9

S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/2011/1793 (Mar. 17, 2011).
Libya Profile, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13755445, (last updated Dec. 1, 2011).
11
Ouster of Tunisia president: An Opportunity for Arab Autocrats to Respond to the People, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2011/0114/0usterof-Tunisia-president-An -opportunity-for-Arab-autocrats-to-respond-to-the-people.
12
S.C. Res. 580, U.N. Doc. S/2011/580 (Sept. 16, 2011).
13 Id.
14 Id.
10

15

t6

Id. at ~ 12.
Id.
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2016 on October 27, 2011, following Gaddafi's death, the UNSMIL mission continues to assist
Libya's transition to democracy. 17
The Security Council has granted UNSMIL broad authority in assisting the Libyan
government in its transitional process. The Council also established missions in 1999 to assist
Kosovo and East Timor transition to new governments. The mandates for both missions granted
the UN broad powers to assist in the legislative, judiciary, and executive functions of
government. The Security Council, through these missions, is playing a larger role in national
politics. While the UN Charter and the International Court of Justice have the potential of
limiting the Security Council's powers, they have instead bolstered the Council's power by
supporting and reaffirming the Council's actions, not striking them down. Nevertheless, the
UN' s role in assisting transitional governments can have a beneficial consequence as the UN can
bring in expertise and experience into the field to make a more successful constitution. The
Security Council, however, should not go unchecked. States must create international law
limiting the Council's influence in post-conflict countries, or a jus post bellum.
UN missions are vested with powers that often extend beyond technical assistance. This
paper examines the legal limits of the Security Council's power in assisting states in their
transition to a democratic form of governance. Section I provides a general overview of the
Security Council's powers, functions, and limitations as enumerated by the UN Charter. It also
explores the International Court of Justice as a check on the Council's Power. Section II takes an
in-depth look at the UN missions in East Timor and Kosovo which helped the countries establish
democratic governance. Section III explores the problem of UN infringement on state
sovereignty and possible limitations on Security Council powers. It looks ahead to how the
17

S.C. Res. 2016, UN Doc. S/Res/2016 (Oct. 27, 2011).
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Council's power in post conflict societies can be limited. Section IV determines whether the UN
is ultimately a positive influence in assisting post conflict states transition to democracy.
The paper concludes that in countries where there is a complete lack of political
institutions, like in Libya, the UN is a positive force in establishing the rule of law. The UN is a
powerful organization that does not abuse it power but assists transitions to democracy by
bringing expertise and experience to the affected country. While the Security Council is now
largely unchecked, issues of state sovereignty should be addressed through creating a jus post

bellum where international law would limit the scope of the Security Council's power in
peacekeeping operations. A jus post bellum will allow the UN to be involved in transitional
governments but will constrain its power so as not to infringe on national sovereignty.

I. Limitations on Security Council Powers
The United Nations Charter, drafted and signed in 1945 by the 51 states at the time, 18
enumerates the UN Security Council's powers. The Charter establishes the General Assembly,
Security Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, and the UN Economic and
Social Council as the main organs of the UN. 19 The Charter is divided into 19 chapters
containing 111 articles which explain the role, functions, and powers of each of the organs. As a
simple analogy, the UN parallels a governmental structure, with a legislature, judicial and
executive branch. In theory, the General Assembly can be seen as the Legislature, the
International Court of Justice as the judicial branch, and the Security Council as the executive,
enforcing the legislatures' decisions. In reality, the Security Council is more than just an

18

Growth in United Nations Member States, 1945-present, UN, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last
visited Nov. 14, 2011).
19
Main Bodies, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/index.shtml, (last accessed Oct. 28, 2011).
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executive. It is capable of passing resolutions on its own, acting as a legislature, and enforcing
them as an executive.
One of the UN's many objectives is to maintain international peace and security.
Recently, the UN has espoused the notion of promoting democratic governance and order in
countries like Kosovo and East Timor. Historically, this concept of establishing the "rule of law"
was included in early UN missions. In fact the term itself came about in the 1990s when
President George H.W. Bush pushed the idea that international peace and security can be
established thought the rule of law. 20 Secretary General Kofi Annan further promoted this
concept by including it in his annual report in 2006 which supported "enhancing UN support for
the rule of law." 21 Since then, the concept of establishing the rule of law in post conflict
countries has become quite prevalent. But this has not been without controversy. The rule of law
is often associated with western style democracies. 22 The west criticizes the east for having a
lack of rule of law?3 However, the east criticizes the west for imposing western style liberal
democracies. 24
After the Cold War, The Security Council has exercised its powers with greater
frequency. For nearly the first 40 years of the UN's creation, between 1945 and 1988, the UN
only created thirteen peacekeeping missions. But, after the Cold War, from 1988 to 2008, over
fifty new UN peacekeeping missions were established. This may be due partly to the US and

20

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REBUILDING SOCIETIES AFTER CONFLICT

2009)

!d.
!d. at 139.
23 !d.
21
22

24/d.

--

136 (Brett Bowden et al. eds.
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Russia agreeing on more issues, leading to fewer resolutions being vetoed. But more UN
missions may also reflect the broader role for the UN in the recent decades? 5
26

On June 26, 1945, 51 nations met in San Francisco and signed the UN Charter. Since
then, the Security Council has expanded its powers and is now dealing with issues such as the
rule of law and national constitution making that were not readily foreseeable to the states when
they originally created the organization. This raises the issue of whether there should be a check
on UN Security Council power, and whether such a check was drafted into the Charter.
A. The UN Charter
The United Nations Charter gives the Security Council broad powers to maintain
international peace and security. 27 The Security Council has used these powers widely and in
varying ways by issuing resolutions, imposing sanctions, as it did to stop Iran's nuclear program
in 2010,28 and even calling for military action, as it did in the GulfWar?9 Chapter V of the UN
Charter lays out the structure, function and powers of the Security Council. The Council is
composed of five permanent members, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and
China. In addition, there are ten rotating, nonpermanent members. Security Council resolutions
must have an affirmative vote by at least nine members, including all five of the permanent
members in order to pass a reslolution. Thus, the most basic check on Council power is the
structure itself where there must be a majority vote to pass a resolution. If states do not agree
with a resolution, it simply cannot leave the Council.

25ld
26

Growth in United Nations Member States, 1945-present, UN, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last
visited Nov. 14, 2011).
27
U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
28
S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1929 (Jun. 9, 2010).
29
S.C. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/Res/686 (Mar. 2, 1991).
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The functions and powers of the Security Council are laid out in Article 24 of the UN
Charter, which states that "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations,
its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility
the Security Council acts on their behalf. " 30 This is a broad function for the Council but is
somewhat limited by subsequent articles.
Chapter VI of the charter explores how the Security Council can promote the pacific
settlement of disputes and encourages states to settle disputes in a peaceful matter. Article 33
maintains that "states shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, meditation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice." 31 The Charter encourages states going to the International
Court of Justice.
Chapter VII, deals with action with respect to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
and acts of aggression." 32 Here, the UN recommends that UN members apply certain measures
before resorting to force. Article 41 lists these measures as "complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. " 33 If these sanctions seem inadequate
or prove to be inadequate, the Council may take action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restores international peace and security. 34 Furthermore, the action
required out to carry out the Council's resolutions do not necessarily need the consent of all UN

30

U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
Jd. at art. 33 , para. 1.
32
!d. at art. 39.
33
/d. at art. 42.
34 !d.
31
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member states, or even a majority of the states. Under Article 48, the Security Council
determines how the decisions are carried out. 35
Thus, the UN Charter grants the Security Council the very broad responsibility to
maintain international peace and security. While the Charter describes a certain procedure to be
followed when attempting to resolve disputes, through first diplomacy, then sanctions, with force
reserved as a last resort, the Security Council is able to bypass these steps if it deems necessary.
In doing so, it does not need the approval of other UN member states.

B. The International Court of Justice
While the Charter itself gives the Security Council much deference, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) can also be seen as a check on the Council's power. Nevertheless, the
Court has not exercised these powers and has not challenged the Council's authority on any of its
decisions. 36
Recently, the International Court of Justice decided two cases, Prosecutor v. Tadic and
the Lockerbie case, which explored the Security Council's powers. Prosecutor v. Tadic raised
the issue of the ICJ's jurisdiction. 37 Tadic, a Bosnian Serb war criminal, was tried for 31
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war and crimes
against humanity related to the torture and murder of Muslims in a Serb run prison camp in
Bosnia. 38 He challenged the ICJ's jurisdiction and argued it was not legitimately exercising
jurisdiction in his case. In addition, he argued that the UN did not have the power to create a

35

U.N. Charter art 48, para 1.
Thomas M. Franck. The "Powers ofAppreciation ": Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 Am. J
Int'l L.519, 519-523 (1992).
37
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT -94-1-T ICJ (May 7, 1997)
38
Tadic Case: The Verdict, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/7537, (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
36
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judicial branch. The court concluded that Court derives is jurisdiction through the body that
formed it. The ICJ is a body under the Security Council, therefore the Council can determine the
ICJ's jurisdiction. 39
In the Lockerbie case, the ICJ could have expanded the Court's influence and assumed
power as a check to the Security Council. In that case, the ICJ could have established the
principal of judicial review and could have given itself unchecked power, within the limits of the
UN Charter, much like Marbury v. Madison functioned for the Supreme Court of the United

States. 40 Instead, the Court chose to answer the question more narrowly.
In Questions of Interpretation and application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aereal Incident at Lockerbie, or more commonly known as the Lockerbie case, the
United States and United Kingdom requested that Libya surrender the two nationals charged
with bombing Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 over Lockerbie Scotland. Libya challenged the validity
of Resolution 748, which issued sanctions against Libya, and raised the issue of "whether a
decision by the Security Council may override the legal rights of States and if so ... are there any
limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? ... and what body, if other than the Security
Council, is competent to say what those limits are?"41 The court maintained that while the
Council's powers are broad, they are not unlimited. The Council is limited by the UN Charter
under Article 2 which states that a state must exercise their rights in good faith, 42 meaning that
states have a duty under the Charter to act in good faith in an individual capacity and as an

/d.
°Franck, supra note 36.

39

4

41

Vera Gowlland-Debbas. The Relationship Between the International Court ofJustice and the Security Council in
Light of the Lockerbie Case. 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 643, 643-677 (1994).
42

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2.
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organ. 43 The court also pointed out that the Security Council and General Assembly are both
subject to recourse form an ad hoc committee which can be composed of jurists or, the UN
organs can create a joint conference. The General Assembly or Security Council can pass a
resolution to form such a committee if they feel a need to review the legality of their decisions.
Therefore, the ICJ should not be considered the only body capable of reviewing UN resolutions.
In the Lockerbie case, the Court pointed out that when the Charter was drafted, proposals
to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice were
not accepted. 44 However, some form of judicial review was not ruled out altogether.

45

Therefore,

46
the ICJ and ad hoc committees are still in place if the need arises to review UN decisions.

Nevertheless, these ad hoc committees have never been used to review the legality of UN
missions. 47 Therefore, the notion of such committees being a check on the Council's power is yet
to be realized.
Thus, the ICJ did not establish a real limit on the Security Council's power. The
Lockerbie holding indicates that the Charter is a limit on the Council's power but in its current
form, the Charter sets loose boundaries on the Council's function. As the Court has never
exercised its power to hold a Council decision to be contrary to the objectives of UN goals, it
remains a force to legitimize and bolster Council decisions, not to strike them down.
Nevertheless, establishing a method of judicial review may be beneficial to the legitimacy of UN

43

Erika de Wet. THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 195 (Hart
Publ'g 2004).
44
Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 41.
45 ld.
46 Jd.
47 Jd.
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A new type peacekeeping mission called third generation peacekeeping is now
emerging.

53

Here, the UN plays an even greater role than in first or second generation missions.

The UN assumes all the functions of governing the territory while the country transitions to build
up its own institutions. Third generation operations are a relatively recent creation and are rarely
used. The two predominant examples are in East Timor and Kosovo, both in 1999. 54 The legal
basis for establishing a civilian government in third generation peacekeeping operations is
established under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Security Council has the implied power to
establish a civilian administration from the express power in Article 41 to take non-military
measures for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. 55 Though these
third generation peacekeeping efforts, some argue that the UN is taking on too great a role in
national politics.
A. Past UN Missions
Between 1976 and 1999, Indonesia occupied East-Timor, a former Portuguese colony. 56
In 1999, the UN sponsored a popular referendum in which the East-Timorese voted for
independence from Indonesia. On October 25, 1999 the UN Security Council established the
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to assist in the formation
of the new government. The UN gave UNTAET unparalleled power for the new country's
administration. The mission's main functions were to administer the territory, exercise legislative
and executive authority during the transition period, and support capacity-building for self-

Jd.
S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (Jun. 10, 1999); S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (Ma7. 17, 1999).
55
de Wet, supra note 43 at 311-336.
56
East Timor, CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/ geos/tt.html (last updated Nov. 10, 20 11)
53

54
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government. 57 The UN passed regulations establishing financial and judicial reform, and
addressed issues of taxation, military discipline and legal aid.

58

The international community felt conditions on the ground were conducive to a
successful outcome. 59 Most Timorese people welcomed UN intervention and saw its presence as
benign. 60 There was a general desire to form a successful new government. However, critics of
the mission argued that a western laws and ideals were imposed in a country whose citizens
could not readily understand the laws. 61 The UN adopted idea of good governance was not what
the East Timorese would necessarily want for themselves.
The UNTAET mission ended on May 20, 2002, when the country became fully
independent. 62 However, UN involvement in East Timor did not stop there. On May 17, 2002,
the Security Council established the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET) under resolution 1410. 63 This new and continuing mission provides "assistance to
core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor,"

64

thus

maintaining a limited UN presence.
The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is a second
example of third generation peacekeeping. The UN Security Council did not authorize force in
Kosovo. The military operation was led by NATO. However, the UN led efforts to assist Kosovo

57

East Timor, UN, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pastletimor/etimor.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
Kristin Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant's
Law-Making Powers, 50 McGill L.J. 285, 313-14 (2005).
59
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REBUILDING SOCIETIES AFTER CONFLICT, supra note 20 at 136
60 ld.
6lld.
62
East Timor, supra note 57.
63 ld.
64 ld.

58
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in transitioning to a stable government. 65 UNMIK operated under resolution 1244 which granted
the mission extensive powers in establishing a civilian government. 66 The main responsibilities
of the mission included performing basic civilian administrative functions, such as organizing
and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous selfgovernment. 67 This included holding elections, supporting reconstruction of the economy and
infrastructure, humanitarian organization, maintaining law and order, and protecting human
rights. 68 Under the mandate, the mission could continue for as long as necessary. 69
UNMIK was a joint effort with NATO and the European Union. The UN established a
multilateral Kosovo Force (KFOR) and civilian presence which was UNMIK's main
responsibility. UNMIK established a four part structure. The UN led the civil administration
component, focusing on improving health, education, the police, and courts. The UN also
coordinated the humanitarian component, led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
where it provided support to refugees and cleared landmines. The Organization of Security and
Cooperation in Europe led an institution building component led and promoted democratization
and training of local administrators. Lastly, the European Union led to rebuild infrastructure and
promote a market based economic system. 70 The mandate gave a special representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG) the power to oversee all four aspects ofUNMIK.

65

71

NATO's Role in Kosovo, NATO, http://www.nato.int/kosovo!history.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
S.C. Res 1244, U.N. Doc. SIRES 1244 (Jun 10, 1999).
67
S.C. Res. 1244, ~ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (Jun. 10, 1999).
68
United Nations Resolution 1244, UNMIK, http ://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/1244.aspx (last visited Dec. 13,
2011).
69 ld.
70
Matheson, supra note 51 at 114.
71
Gregory H. Fox. HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 308 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2008)
66
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UNMIK played a very significant role in Kosovo' s new government. It decreed certain
laws made while Kosovo was not an autonomous state as invalid. 72 It established a constitutional
framework for self government which planed to transfer power to the new self government. 73 It
also held elections for the Kosovo assembly and municipalities. 74 Thus, UNMIK is an example
of a situation where the UN was basically governing the interim state.
Libya's situation is similar to East Timor in that the Libyan transitional authorities asked
the UN to assist in their transition to democracy. The transitional authorities in East Timor also
asked the UN to come in to assist with the new constitution. Thus, the initial step of the UN
mission in East Timor, in being asked to come in, is similar to Libya's. On the other hand,
Libyans, and the Middle East at large is wary of western influence in the region after having a
bitter history of European imperialism and colonialism. The UN seems to support a western style
of government, by promoting liberal democracies. Like the UNTAET critics, Libyans may not
be so willing to welcome the UN style of rule of law governance.
UNSMIL, like UNMIK, was also established under the leadership of a Special
Representative of the Secretary General. 75 However, the mandate, as discussed above, does not
give the SRSG as broad and sweeping powers as in the UNMIK mandate. Under UNSMIL, the
SRSG has broad powers of restoring public security and the rule of law, among other
responsibilities. 76 We have yet to see how the mission will play out and how much power the UN
will ultimately exercise in Libya.

!d.
!d.
74 !d.
75
S.C. Res. 580, ~ 12, U.N. Doc. S/20111580 (Sept. 16, 2011).
76 !d.
72

73
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Similar to the European Union's involvement in rebuilding Kosovo's economy, the Arab
League has the potential to play a key role in Libya's reconstruction. The Arab League is a
regional organization consisting of 22 member states and is based in Cairo. 77 While the League
has been factitious, it recently came together in denouncing the human rights abuses in Syria.
The Arab League may come together again in helping Libya stimulate its economy and the
country at large.
So far, Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC) is moving slowly towards
democracy. When the NTC declared Libya liberated after Gaddafi's death, it established a
timeline for the transition. 78 No elections have taken place yet. Under current plans in Libya,
elections to choose members of a constitutional panel will be held in June. 79 This would set the
stage for presidential and legislative elections. Presidential elections are planned to occur in 18
months. 80 While Libya awaits a new government, hundreds of revolutionary militias are
maintaining order across the country. 81
As the elections and the constitution making process have not begun yet, i_t is difficult to
see what role the UN in playing in Libya's reconstruction. Whether the UN will play as large a
role as it did in East Timor and Kosovo is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, the Security Council has
given UNSMIL broad powers to have great influence in the country.

III. Infringement on State Sovereignty
77

Arab League, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/arab_league/index.html (last updated Nov.
28, 2011).
78
Mary Beth Sheridan. Libyan Leader wants to Speed up Elections, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2011),
http ://www. washingtonpost.com/world/libyan-leader-wants-to-speed-upelections/2011/10/30/giQAdmGFXM_story.html.
79 ld
80
Libyan Elections in Eight Months Says Jibril, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15417653 (last
updated Oct. 22, 2011 ).
81
Sheridan, supra note 78 .

Khokhar 18
Black's Law dictionary defines sovereignty as a "state vested with independent and
supreme authority. "

82

This notion of sovereignty entails the notion that a state is independent and

autonomous. It should be able to govern itself and make its own laws. When an outside body
influences its legislative process, it is infringing on state sovereignty.
The UN' s establishment of third generation peacekeeping missions is a significant
expansion of UN powers and raises the issue of whether these missions and the UN' s
involvement in domestic politics infringes on state sovereignty. In East Timor, Kosovo, and now
in Libya, the UN established assistance missions for countries undergoing governmental
transitions. In these situations, there is a danger that the UN may impose a system of governance
that may not be well suited for the state. In a sense, the UN, as an outside force in a sovereign
state, may be seen as an occupier. 83 The "occupation," however, is not in any way belligerent,
nor is it against the country's will. The transitional authorities in Kosovo, East Timor, and Libya
have all consented to the UN mission to support the new government. 84
There is established international law governing occupations. In cases where there is
belligerent occupation, there are a number of conventions establishing laws in the time of war.
Some of these conventions include the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in the Time of war, and the Additional Protocols of 1977. 85 These conventions
preserve the "conservation principle," which calls for occupying forces to make an effort to
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preserve the social, political, and economic institutions of the prior regime. 86 This has the effect
of preserving the citizens' sovereignty.
However, international laws mentioned above do not constrain Security Council action
for two reasons. First, the UN is certainly not a belligerent force and it is highly controversial to
call it an occupier. These laws apply exclusively to belligerent forces occupying a nation.
Second, these conventions are only binding on the individual states that ratify them. Because
International Organizations, such as the UN, are not parties to these conventions, they are not
bound by the laws. 87 Thus, it is difficult to instill international law applying to belligerent
occupations. International law must be reformed to establish limits on what the Security Council
can and cannot do in post conflict situations.
Furthermore, the Arab Spring may require a completely different approach from that used
by previous institutions as nations transition from autocracy to democracy. Thus, the
conservation principle must be abandoned. Preserving the prior regimes' institutions would mean
to continue with authoritarian rule. Prior means of governance must be abandoned for more
inclusive and transparent governance.
There must be, however, some limitations on UN power in post conflict countries. The
international community must reform occupation law to encompass peaceful "occupations" such
as transitional missions set up by the UN. The reforms governing post conflict areas, called jus
post bellum, must reflect contemporary conditions and expectations of the UN missions

conducted today. 88 There should be an increased emphasis on issues such as human rights and
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democracy. 89 Such a law could restrict the way in which the UN may legislate and guarantee that
the UN is not infringing on sovereignty. Furthermore, jus post bellum would apply to
international organizations as well as states that have signed onto any treaties.
With the UN assisting a number of countries in their transitional or constitution making
process, the issue arises as to whether the UN' s involvement is an interference with a state's
right to self determination, or its right to choose its own style of government and laws. The UN
Security Council strongly adopts democracy as the best method of governance, 90 even though not
all of the permanent five members ascribe to this ideology, like China. In fact, the UN has even
established the United Nations Democracy Fund to promote civilian participation in the
democratic process. 91 Nevertheless, the UN might be seen as imposing a style of a western
liberal democracy. Just because the Council deems this to be the best style of government, it may
not actually be the best option available for the particular country in question.
While the issue of state sovereignty and UN occupation may seem problematic, one must
remember that the UN is an international organization that states have created. While no state has
done so, a member state can always withdraw from the UN for any reason. When a state
becomes a UN member, it agrees to the principles laid out in the UN Charter. States are well
aware of the Security Council's power. It is common knowledge that the UN espouses the idea
of basic freedoms, and human rights, among other values. If a country is in disagreement with
such beliefs, it can withdraw its membership. However, membership revocation may be a harsh
step for states, as they may lose many benefits they enjoy with UN membership. Thus, the idea
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that state is impliedly consenting to UN missions by simply being a member may not be a strong
argument. 92
Nevertheless, it should be noted, in most cases where the UN has assisted in constitution
making, they have been asked to be there. 93 States have not seen UN missions as an infringement
to their sovereignty. If a state does not wish to impose the type of government it thinks the UN
will endorse, it need not ask them for their expertise. For example, while Libya's transitional
government called on UN assistance, Egypt and Tunisia did not. Egyptians and Tunisians are
more confident of transitioning to a democratic regime on their own.
IV. Is UN Involvement Beneficial?
We have seen that thus far, the UN's authority is largely unchecked in third generation
peacekeeping missions. Ultimately, is this power beneficial or a detriment to states? While the
UN still has a minimal presence in Kosovo and East Timor, both countries have had a relatively
smooth transition to democracy and independence.

94

Critics often raise issues on state sovereignty and the concern of creating a hegemonic
intemationallaw. 95 By abandoning the conservation principle, the UN will be free to instill
whatever laws it deems appropriate. This imposition of laws could even be seen as a form of
neo-colonialism. 96 The UN approach in many situations is to theorize a blueprint that seems
successful and to apply it in different countries. 97 This approach would apply a generic solution
to similar problems that may arise in a government's transition. However, each country is unique
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in its history, politics, social and cultural background. A generic formula may not work in all
countries.
Nevertheless, the UN is a positive influence in assisting transitional authorities in postconflict situations. The UN brings in expertise. It has a over 60 years of experience as an
international organization and now 193 member states from which to collect data on issues such
as constitution making and election assistance. 98 For example, the UN's report on constitution
making assists transitional governments and constitutional committees in drafting a successful
constitution. Such a report can assist countries like Kosovo or Libya in their transition. The study
found that a more inclusive constitution making process and greater civilian participation led to a
more successful constitution. 99 The study examined a number of states in the process of creating
their constitutions. Some of the countries investigated were South Africa, Namibia, Spain,
Ethiopia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, among others. The UN was not involved in the process for
many of these states but nevertheless noted what was and was not successful in the countries'
experiences. While the study noted the importance of an inclusive constitution-making process, it
noted that too much participation can just lead to a short term compromise instead of a lasting
constitution that actually works. The report also stressed the importance of preparatory work,
that the process is not dominated by a single party, and found that constitutions are more
successful when there is a non-elected commission but also elected constituent assemblies. For
example, in Namibia, the constitutional committee was able to revise a draft that the constituent
assembly had drafted. 100
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In terms of participation, the report also found that African countries were successful in
promoting participation by creating a grassroots movement to raise awareness. 101 Eritrea reached
people through radio and by going to villages. However, in larger countries, with isolated
populations like in Brazil, Columbia and Nicaragua, this proved to be a more difficult task.
Nevertheless, it is important to first have a draft constitution that is written by the elite and to
present that to the citizens than to gather their opinions first, or the task of building consensus
among both the people and the elite becomes quite difficult, as was the case in Brazil. 102
Similarly, the UN can bring in expertise in electoral assistance. A UNDP report on
electoral assistance stressed that electoral assistance is most effective when it is focused on longterm capacity development. 103 Transparent elections are important to creating a credible and
legitimate election process as the UN learned in Yemen and Mali. 104 Election assistance can also
provide an entry point for broader government programs. For example, in Pakistan, the UNDP
collaborated with other agencies to develop the Women's Political Participation Project which
reserved 33% of the local government seats for women. 105 Women were trained in gender
sensitivity, awareness raising, advocacy, budgeting and executive legislative relations. This led
to 36,000 women being elected in the 2001 elections. 106
It is important to have public participation in elections which should be inclusive and

work to build broad coalitions. The UN electoral assistance report found that "democracy
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building depends on inclusive, representative and transformative participation." 107 In Kosovo,
the government made an effort to make elections as inclusive as possible. The International
Organization for Migration established hot-lines and conducted in-person polls to allow nearly
90% of Kosovars who were living out of the state to participate in the elections. 108 Thus, the UN
can bring in particularized expertise in election assistance by promoting certain values like
gender equality in Pakistan but also work with other organizations to assist in greater civilian
participation in elections.
Furthermore, the UN can instill democratic ideals, promote human rights, create a strong
civil society, and promote greater civilian participation in governance. The UN is especially
helpful establishing political institutions where there might have been a void, like in East Timor
and Kosovo, where the UN took on a governance role. 109 This also gives the states more
legitimacy in the international community, as the state governments are backed by the UN. 110 In
practice, the world has criticized the UN far more for its inaction, like in the case of the Rwandan
genocide, then for exceeding its powers. 111 Neither the ICJ nor the European Court of Justice
have struck down a Security Council decision for overstepping its bounds, even when the
resolutions might clash with EU laws. 112 The Council's decisions in East Timor and Kosovo
were far more efficient and expeditious than other possible alternatives. 113
History has demonstrated that in practice, the Charter and the Security Council's
structure itself have been effective in checking the Council's power. For example, Russia and
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China felt that the Council exceeded its bounds in its military intervention in Libya. 114 The states
therefore vetoed any resolutions condemning the violence in Syria so that the Council does not
exceed its power again. Furthermore, there has been no instance where a country has taken the
UN to the International Court of Justice claiming a violation of its sovereignty. 115 Time and time
again, countries have instead sought the UN for assistance in transitioning to peace and stability.
The very lack of complaints against the UN is a positive sign. East Timor and Kosovo are still
new countries, so, while their political, economic and social situations will not be as advanced as
other countries', the countries are greatly helped by the expertise and experience that only the
United Nations can provide.
States may have to compromise their autonomy by allowing the UN to have an influential
role in governance. Despite this, temporarily suspending a state's autonomy is appropriate when
the goal is to establish a liberal, autonomous, and sustaining state. 116 Thus, while states are
giving up some autonomy, the end goal in establishing successful, lasting, and legitimate
institutions is beneficial to them. Ultimately, the overwhelming benefits a state can achieve
through UN membership far exceeds any theoretical infringement on sovereignty.
While the Security Council's action in Libya has been criticized using the argument that
there should be no foreign intervention in a domestic conflict, there has been criticism for nonintervention in Syria as well. 117 Even though there will, and should be criticism of an
institution's actions, the UN must continue to act as an international force promoting peace,
stability and security.
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In Libya's case where transitional authorities must rebuild civic institutions, the UNSMIL
will prove to be a helpful tool. As Libyans have only seen one autocratic ruler for the past 42
years, the UN will bring in much needed expertise and experience on state governance,
constitution making, and institution building. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia which have also
undergone transitions, Libya involves greater political, social and economic reconstruction.
Thus, the UN should be able to assist authorities in a smooth transition to democracy.
Conclusion
This paper discussed the powers and limitations of the Security Council in establishing
transitional governance missions in light of the Arab Spring. The International Court of Justice
leaves the Security Council to interpret its own role as laid out in the UN Charter. The Charter
gives the Council sweeping powers to maintain international peace and security. Ultimately, the
states making up the Council act as the biggest check, in that resolutions will not pass if one of
the permanent five states or four or more of the ten nonpermanent members find a resolution
objectionable.
Past UN missions in Kosovo and East Timor have ushered in a new level of UN
involvement in domestic politics. The UN directly governed Kosovo and had a significant role in
East Timor's governance. While these states initially forewent their autonomous powers, the end
goal of establishing a legitimate, democratic, and legitimate government justified the temporary
loss of autonomy.
While UN missions may be beneficial, the Security Council should not have unlimited
powers. A political check through states' veto in passing resolutions is not enough. The
international community must create a jus post bellum, or post conflict law, to establish limits to
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the Security Council's power in transitional governance situations. Such a law will not create an
absolute blueprint on how the UN must conduct itself in establishing a new government but will
create the boundaries of international influence over the affairs of a sovereign state. This will
preserve important international norms of state sovereignty and autonomy while states
undergoing fundamental political and economic change find themselves vulnerable to outside
influence during the transitional phase.

